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Mähler/Shabafrouz/Strüver: Conflict Prevention through Natural Resource Management? increase the incentives for corrupt behavior. Also, dependence on natural resources and high rents from the resource sector may negatively affect socioeconomic development (for example, "Dutch disease," 2 high vulnerability to trade shocks, "white elephants") (Auty 2001) , thus indirectly contributing to internal instability.
However, various largely peaceful and stable resource-exporting countries show that natural resources do not necessarily lead to violent conflict. The existence of these countries also suggests that the emergence or absence of conflict depends on some further conditions (Hegre/Sambanis 2006; Basedau/Lay 2009; Basedau/Mähler/Shabafrouz 2010) . Context conditions that proved to be crucial are the level of resource abundance per capita and outside protection by international actors (Basedau/Lay 2009 ), the quality of political institutions, particularly at the beginning of resource extraction (Boschini/Petterson/Jesper 2004; Karl 2007) , and the ownership structure in the resource sector (Weinthal/Luong 2006) . Another important factor-which influences whether natural resources contribute to violence and economic distortions or whether they lead to socioeconomic development and peace-is the quality of resource management. Recent studies by Le Billon (2008) and the United Nations Environment Programme (Halle 2009 ) argue that resource management can help to avoid resource-related conflicts and may-especially in post-conflict societies-facilitate the funding of peace-related needs (for example, spending on health care, economic revitalization).
Despite the acknowledged importance of resource management, comparative empirical studies of the capacity of resource management instruments to reduce resource-related conflict risks remain scarce. This paper contributes to the filling of this gap, by exploring the link between resource management and conflict in oil-exporting countries. We investigate two research questions: First, on which resource management measures-if any-do resourcedependent countries rely in their response to resource-related risk mechanisms ? Second, what are the effects of these countermeasures on resource-related risk mechanisms in general, and on violent conflict in particular?
The paper proceeds as follows: The subsequent section provides a concise review of the recent literature on resource management, in order to systematically assign the particular countermeasures to specific resource-related risk mechanisms. The third section outlines the methodology used in the following empirical analyses. The fourth and fifth sections explore the presence of countermeasures in a sample of petroleum-dependent countries, and analyze in detail the interplay between countermeasures and resource-related conflict risks in three case studies (Algeria, Nigeria, and Venezuela). Finally, we summarize the results and discuss the theoretical and methodological implications, as well as make policy recommendations for natural resource management in future. 2 The "Dutch disease" effect implies that overvalued real exchange rates undermine the international competitiveness of alternative economic sectors in each respective country. 
Conceptual Approaches to Tackling Resource-related Risks
Regarding resource-related risks associated with the motive mechanisms, some authors suggest the creation of specific revenue-sharing regimes (for example, Bennet 2002) . These regimes should regulate the allocation of resource revenues between the central government, regional authorities, and corporative groups (for example ethnic representatives, trade unions) in both producing and non-producing regions in a legally-binding way, and thus should pacify national disputes and conflicts (particularly secessionist conflicts) over the distribution of resource income. Moreover, resource revenues might be used to increase social spending at the countrywide level. An improvement in public welfare and infrastructure can lead to a dilution of the motives-in other words, grievances-that spur insurgents on (Collier et al. 2009: 25 ff.) . Another possibility for breaking up the motive mechanisms is the implementation of subnational development initiatives that compensate for the negative impacts of resource exploitation (for example, ecological damage, and rural deprivation). Such initiatives might include regional programs for environmental protection, infrastructure development, or employment promotion.
Facing the opportunity mechanism, on the one hand, the number of security forces can be increased and further safety measures to effectively protect production sites and pipelines-and thus to impede illegal oil bunkering, the kidnapping of oil workers, and assaults by rebels-may be adopted (Ross 2001) . On the other hand, foreign countries can also provide additional assistance by, for example, supporting the military protection of oil facilities or through the maintaining of military bases (Basedau/Lay 2009 ).
Turning to the indirect economic risk mechanisms, several authors stress the importance of stabilization funds. These funds help to reduce the vulnerability of resource-exporting nations with regard to the high volatility of commodity prices in the short term (Davis et al. 2001 ). In theory, stabilization funds neutralize windfall gains from the extractive sector in times of high commodity prices and help to save revenues for periods of dwindling commodity prices. A related option is the creation of pension or saving funds to put aside financial assets for the era post-resource depletion. In addition, savings in foreign assets may help against "Dutch disease"-effects like exchange rate appreciation (Stevens/Mitchell 2008: 30) . Mitchell and Stevens (2008) underline that stabilization and saving funds must be endorsed and supported by broader fiscal discipline (for example, control of inflation). Moreover, in the long term the only option for avoiding the economic risks attendant with resource extraction is economic diversification (Auty 1994; Collier/Hoeffler 2000) .
Concerning indirect political-institutional risks, scholars focus on national and transnational transparency initiatives to limit corruption and (unproductive) self-enrichment by the political and economic elites (Karl 2007; Halle 2009; Kolstad/Søreide 2009) . Political institu-tions should thus be rendered more effective and democratic to curb their contribution to economic and social distortions and, on a more general level, to reduce political instability. 3 In sum, the countermeasures able to curb resource-related risk mechanisms can be summarized as shown in Table 1 . 
The Emerging Body of Empirical Studies
While the number of conceptual studies on how to counter resource-related risks increases (for example, Le Billon 2008; Halle 2009; , empirical studies of the outcomes of measures to curb resource-related risk mechanisms remain sparse. A first step in this endeavor has been made by Franke et al. (2007) . The authors statistically analyze the impact of resource governance on the resource-conflict dynamic in 92 resource-dependent countries, and find that "good"-in a conceptually very broad sense-resource governance is related to a decrease in conflict duration and an increase in peace duration.
Regarding the impact of resource management in post-conflict periods, ongoing studies
give a hint that wealth-sharing agreements in peace processes are not consistently positively related to sustainable peace (Binningsbø/Rustad 2010) . Nevertheless, some case studies suggest that revenue-sharing schemes can have a positive effect on peace processes after resource-driven conflicts, if carefully implemented (Boege/Franks 2011) . In a previous small-N analysis of peacebuilding in resource conflicts, Le Billon and Nicholls (2007) conclude that 3 In theory, natural wealth accounts or environmental accounting also improve transparency (Sandbu 2006; Auty 2007) . Natural wealth accounts convert resource revenues into tax revenues and thus promote stronger political pressures on the governments of resource-dependent states (Sandbu 2006: 9ff. Detailed information on the sources used in this and the following section are given in Appendix I. 6 The variables distribution in a scatter plot points to a threshold of 20 percent.
olent means, including domestic violence and terrorism." 7 Second, in the case studies the conflict assessment is refined by drawing on qualitative country reports.
The empirical analysis starts with an overview of the implementation of countermeasures related to indirect risk mechanisms (see Table 1 ) in the oil-dependent countries of the sample. For practical reasons, the existence of sovereign wealth funds and the involvement in international transparency initiatives (for example, Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, Publish What You Pay) are taken as proxies for a country's willingness to engage in resource sector management. Thereafter, we will explore in detail which countermeasures were implemented in response to resource-related risks in Algeria, Nigeria, and Venezuela and, further, assess the reasons for these measures' failure and/or success. 8 The analysis concentrates on the period from 2000 to mid-2010. This not only allows us to take into account periods of both rising (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) and declining oil prices (2008) (2009) ; it is also ascribed to the fact that the discussion and implementation of countermeasures against resource-related risks gained momentum particularly during the last decade.
Dealing with Resource-related Risks in Petroleum-dependent Countries
This section provides an overview of the participation of petroleum-dependent nations in in- The criteria for case selection will be presented in the following section. The empirical analysis encompasses all resource management measures that are listed in Table 1 . However, the presentation of the analysis is limited on countermeasures, which respond to existent resource-related risk mechanisms. First, oil-dependent countries committed to both of the transparency initiatives did not experienced a significant improvement in the control of corruption. 11 In the Congo and Gabon, who participate in both the EITI and PWYP, the level of corruption significantly increased. In the remaining countries that participate in both initiatives (Cameroon, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Norway, Yemen) the level of corruption in public power did not substantially change. In none of the countries engaged in the EITI and PWYP did the level of corruption decrease significantly; nevertheless, in Cameroon and Nigeria the situation did improve slightly (see Appendix 1).
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For further information on PWYP, see <www.publishwhatyoupay.org> (September 1, 2010).
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The WGI variable Control of Corruption "measures the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 'capture' of the state by elites and private interests" (see <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/cc.pdf>, September 2, 2010).
Second, comparing the change in political stability in the years 2000-2009 in oil-dependent countries that experienced a post-1946 civil war shows that nations with a high willingness to implement countermeasures (in other words, Nigeria) experienced a significant deterioration in political stability since 2000, but also that countries with two initiatives (except Yemen) generally showed higher political stability-or at least no further deterioration.
In cases with only one measure implemented, three out of five of countries experienced a deterioration in the political stability (see Table 2 ). Third, the willingness of petroleum-dependent countries to initiate resource-related countermeasures (none, one, or two countermeasures) seems to deepen with an increasing degree of political instability and the existence of (prior) armed conflicts (see Appendix 1).
To scrutinize the interplay between resource-related risk factors, countermeasures, and internal conflict the following section provides a more detailed study of resource governance in three petroleum-dependent countries: Algeria, Nigeria, and Venezuela. These countries hold a similar list of resource-specific and several non-resource-specific context conditions (for example, a low level of resource revenues per capita, high population growth, cultural heterogeneity, a high level of socioeconomic inequality) but differ in their levels of political stability and/or in their engagement in resource management. The rationale behind the selection of Algeria and Nigeria lies in both countries' apparently strong efforts to implement countermeasures and their differences in the development of political stability. Also, both countries experienced an ongoing intrastate armed conflict during 2010. Venezuela, in con-13 trast, was seen as a paradigmatic case for countries showing a rather low level of willingness to engage in countermeasures, as well as a sharp deterioration in political stability. 12 5 Evidence from Three Major Oil-producing Countries
Oil Risks and Countermeasures in Algeria
In contrast to the other country cases that follow, Algeria has gained significantly in political stability since 1996 (see Appendix 1)-mainly due to the fact that the conflict intensity was very high in the years after 1991. During the intrastate war period (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) , various Islamist groups challenged the state authority, and the death toll is estimated between 100,000 and 200,000. The hydrocarbon rich regions, however,-located in the Sahara Desert-were widely spared from clashes between conflicting parties.
The conflict, which still persists, albeit at a lower level of intensity, is not directly about resources. A partial link between the three causal mechanisms underlying our study (motive, opportunity, and indirect effects) is nevertheless possible (Basedau/Mähler/Shabafrouz 2010; Shabafrouz 2010b) . As the intrastate war was nurtured by indirect problematic effects of high dependence on hydrocarbons by the Algerian economy (Shabafrouz 2010a) , it is necessary to look for countermeasures aimed at improving these conditions. Also, motive and opportunity could have played a part for the insurgents: they tried to attack the oil infrastructure so as to weaken the regime (opportunity) and might also have considered the control of resources as one of the key advantages should they take over power (motive). The rulers, for their part, clung to power, in which they were supported by, among others, the oil sector that they controlled. They also used their hydrocarbon income to sustain military power and to buy off parts of the opposition (following the assumptions of the rentier state theory). 13 Violence is now more and more directed towards gaining international attention, a fact also symbolized by the new label of the largest terror organization in Algeria: "Al Qaida of the Islamic Maghreb" (AQIM). Aside from this, there is a lot of delinquency, a situation favored by the distorting effects of the resource-based economy. Paired with general social developments such as the demographic dynamics (mainly the "youth bulge" and the continuing urbanization), they nurture the persistent potential for conflict.
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The case selection is further a consequence of practical considerations. The three cases were previously studied in a research project, which identified crucial contextual conditions for systematically explaining the resource-conflict link (see Footnote 1). In this project a sample of four "comparable oil exporters" (in other words, Algeria, Iran, Nigeria, Venezuela) had been studied (cf. Basedau et al. 2010) . We discarded the case of
Iran from the present sample, as in this case the imposed international economic sanctions on trade and investment might have substantially altered the effects of any potential resource management measures.
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The rentier state effects are still observable today, with 79 percent of the state income in 2008 deriving from the hydrocarbon sector (calculation based on IMF 2010: 24).
Countermeasures Related to the Motive Mechanisms
In Algeria, oil revenues automatically belong to the central government-no special resource revenue distribution scheme has yet been established. Nevertheless, there has been an increase in social spending in the last years. The five-year plan for the years 2010-2014 deploys 40 percent of its total budget, and the state budget of 2011 allocates an additional 18 percent
(1,200 billion DA) to the social sector (La Tribune, October 4, 2010) . This distribution of funds can be understood as an instrument by which to increase social satisfaction and to buy political loyalty.
At the subnational level, both the living conditions and the measures for their improvement need to be taken into consideration, as they can provide serious grounds for frustration and thereby for violence. Up to now, the lack of coherent and regionally-balanced efforts in support of development have hardened and increased the already existing disparities in Algeria between the more developed and urbanized north and the less densely populated south (Mattes 2008: 50) , where the resource-rich regions are located. However, in the last years, this situation has been increasingly acknowledged by decision-makers who, as a result, introduced more programs for regional planning and employment creation, for, among others, young adults. Decentralization policy has had some positive effects, not only for poverty reduction and agricultural services, but also for the wider participation of the population in politics and society. Their impact, however, on infrastructure (health, housing, education) and on environmental policy was less significant.
Countermeasures Related to the Opportunity Mechanism
To reduce the opportunity mechanism, which can be linked to all activities intended to weaken the state or oil companies through violence, the authorities have put great effort into enhancing the security sector. As the state controls the resource flows tightly, via the stateowned Sonatrach (the national oil and gas company), it is a major source of its income. But this also makes it its Achilles heel: the insurgents sometimes target personnel and infrastructure in the resource region. 14 The main measure taken against these security threats is the high presence of the military in the resource extraction region (and in other sensitive areas, such as the country's capital, Algiers) and the obligation for multinational oil and gas companies to protect their workers, sometimes by private security firms or by state security forces. Therefore, the military presence in the extractive regions is high, which makes attacks difficult and the looting of oil re- In most of the cases, the countermeasures against violence are employed on a national scale. For some security activities-such as the Trans-Saharan counterterrorism initiativethere is to a certain extent also cooperation with the United States and several states of the Sahel region.
Addressing Indirect Mechanisms
Several efforts have been undertaken to reduce the economic distortions caused by oil dependence. Based on the awareness of the risks created by the oil price changes, in 2000 a regulation fund for windfall revenues of foreign currencies was created. Budget surplus, which were on a special benchmark value of the oil price, were saved here. 15 The fund is now, since In terms of macroeconomic stability, the assessment is slightly more positive. Following the IMF (2010), the Algerian government has inflation under control (at approximately 3 percent), despite the sharp increase in fresh food prices. The state has tried to circumvent an overheating of its economy by holding a large portion of its revenues abroad, mainly in the US. 17 The withdrawal of these sums can only be done in a several-step procedure, thus Algeria has no direct and quick access to these funds.
Even if some investment has been made to modernize the public administration, no fundamental reform is in sight which would improve the obscure decision-making process and likely that the oil and gas sectors are highly susceptible to corruption, as particularly good "earnings" are to be made there, even if it is difficult to provide evidence of this.
Beyond national (rather ineffective) initiatives and institutions for enhancing transparency in the resource sector, there is no membership or candidature by Algeria for the EITI.
The "Association Algerienne de Lutte contre la Corruption" is a member of PWYP, but its scope, as an NGO, to do anything more than campaign is limited. But individual initiatives do sometimes succeed in revealing large-scale corruption. 19 As the corruption and selfenrichment of several members of the state class has led to a deep distrust from parts of the population, and can provide-in combination with worsening socioeconomic conditions and ideological affinity-a fertile ground for further recruitment by violent Islamist groups, this ongoing challenge needs to be taken particularly seriously.
Oil Risks and Countermeasures in Nigeria
While the UCDP/PRIO registered only one violent conflict in the Niger Delta-Nigeria's Oil has a substantial influence upon conflict dynamics, yet it nevertheless fails to completely explain the violence. The conflicts are marked by a complex interplay of various causal resource-specific and non-resource-specific factors. In many cases, the root causes of the conflicts go back to the pre-oil era. 21 Oil served as an additional conflict-triggering factor;
firstly, by being a motive for national and subnational conflicts. Thus, conflicts over the distribution of oil revenues have intensified the polarization between the economically less developed, Muslim, northern states of the country and the, mainly Christian, ethnically heterogeneous south of the Niger Delta. Moreover, at the subnational level, there are conflicts between different (ethnic) communities within the Delta that have been exacerbated by oil. Finally, conflicts within the resource region are also motivated by the destruction of farmland and the pollution of water and air due to oil production.
The second way in which oil has triggered violence is through the opportunity mechanism. Particularly since 1999, oil has contributed to the perpetuation of violence in the Niger Delta through the illegal oil trade and the kidnapping of oil workers. A third factor is that oil has also had conflict-inducing indirect economic and institutional impacts. Oil dependence has deepened the socioeconomic distortions of the national economy. Although the direct link with violence can scarcely be proven, it can be assumed that these aspects at least enhanced the disposition towards (violent) protests. Moreover, oil revenues have boosted corruption and patronage, and thus further weakened unconsolidated political institutions.
Countermeasures Related to the Motive Mechanisms
There is an increased awareness within the Nigerian government of the north-south polarization over the issue of oil revenue distribution. As a reaction, in 1999 a reform of the derivation formula-specifying the share of oil revenues distributed to the regions where the oil is extracted-was enacted. The share of the oil extraction regions was increased from 3 percent up to 13 percent. In practice the reform has-combined with a rising oil price-brought a considerable increase in the state budgets and local political agencies in the southern states, leading to a certain appeasement of the political elites. But, as much of the revenues are 20 In employing the Worldwide Governance Indicators a fact that must be taken into consideration is that they measure the national average of instability-which includes further internal conflicts, for example in Northern Nigeria, circumstances that are not related to oil.
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For example, cultural and political cleavages, weak political institutions, and an unconsolidated statehood.
For further details, see Mähler (2010) . 
Countermeasures Related to the Opportunity Mechanism
Given the incitement of violence spurred by the illegal oil trade, the kidnapping of oil workers, and the attacks on oil facilities, the Nigerian government has launched several law en- 
Addressing the Indirect Mechanisms
To address the negative economic effects of oil dependency, the Nigerian government set up The Nigerian government has, furthermore, pursued several initiatives to foster the nonoil export sector (Walkenhort 2006: 19) . These initiatives have been intensified more recently, and, although they still constitute mostly single measures and as such are not comprehensive concepts, the economic performance of the non-oil sector (in other words, agriculture and services) has improved (EIU 2009: 3) . This tendency, however, cannot yet be qualified as a general turnaround, because oil exports still account for 90 percent of total exports. More-over, all sustainable economic development is hampered by the chronic lack of infrastructure, by the low incomes of consumers, and by the energy deficiencies (EIU 2009: 21) .
To combat endemic corruption, the Nigerian government has adopted special measures While some minor progress in the implementation of anti-corruption policies is indeed identifiable (BTI 2010)-it should also be noted that during the last years, for the first time, high-ranking politicians have been prosecuted for illegal financial activities-corruption remains endemic. Moreover, the implementation of anti-corruption policies has been much less effective at the regional states and local levels than it has been at the central government level (Higgins 2008: 7) . Political will for the actual implementation of these transparency initiatives seems to have finally become less enthusiastic recently. Thus, Nigeria has made improvements in its ranking in the Corruption Perception Index during the last ten years, but its assessment slightly worsened again between 2008 and 2009. 23 A similar tendency can be recognized with regard to the WGI Indicator "Control of Corruption," which has improved substantially since 2000, but still, nevertheless, remains clearly well below the regional average (WGI).
Finally, the basic reform of the oil sector has not yet been implemented; it is still discussed in the National Assembly and is, furthermore, criticized by several private oil companies.
Oil Risks and Countermeasures in Venezuela
Generally, the level of internal violence has been low in Venezuela. Thus, the UCDP/PRIO data does not register any intrastate armed conflict in Venezuela in the 2000s. Still, it should be noted that there had been a period of a relative increase in internal violence at the end of Although the presence of oil cannot sufficiently explain the surge of internal violence, 24 the increase in conflict is at least partly associated with the petroleum-factor. The oil-related risk factors in Venezuela are mostly indirect ones-economic mechanisms and, of secondary importance, political-institutional mechanisms. The oil sector has caused deep socioeconomic distortions to emerge in the national economy: single-sided dependency; decline of agricultural sector; price shocks and, consequently, the rise of poverty and unemployment.
Furthermore, oil has boosted the corruption and ineffectiveness of the political institutions, so that they have become more and more incapable of peaceful conflict resolution. There has been no internal violence due to the opportunity mechanisms that oil may provide. Although the production sites and transport routes are, theoretically, accessible targets, they have not actually been assaulted, and neither has there been any substantial illegal oil trade so as to finance warfare. 25 Until the 1990s virtually no (violent) conflicts occurred about how the benefits and costs of resource production should be distributed between different groups in Venezuela. The national motive mechanism has, however, been somewhat increasingly at work during recent years, fostering low-level conflicts-in the form of disputes over the distribution and spending of oil revenues. At the subnational level, the intensity of conflicts in the oil-producing regions has also remained rather low. 26
Countermeasures Related to the Motive Mechanisms
While no special revenue distribution scheme has been established-the oil revenues auto- The analysis of such measures will hence be skipped in the Venezuelan case. Still, it is worth mentioning that during recent years in Venezuela there has been a rise in the salaries of the army in particular and a substantial increase in military spending in general (SIPRI 2009a) . This increased clientelistic allocation of oil rents works relatively successfully as an instrument of appeasement and gratification.
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This can be attributed to the fact that the main sites of oil production are, on the one hand, in the sparsely populated rainforest and the Orinoco Delta, and, on the other, in the giant Lake Maracaibo. Thus, although oil production does cause pollution,in both of these cases there are only a small number of people who are significantly negatively affected by the detrimental consequences of oil production (Mähler 2009 have been issued. There is, however, a significant mismatch between the articulated plans of environmental policy and their actual implementation. Deforestation, water and soil pollution, and erosion continue to be key environmental problems associated with the exploitation of oil (European Commission 2007: 46) , so that in Venezuela environmental policy in practice has had only very little success thus far. Still, regional protests or conflicts are at a rather low level. This is, on the one hand, due to the geographical-demographical conditions mentioned above; on the other, it can also partly be attributed to the general increase in social spending by the government.
Addressing the Indirect Mechanisms
To reduce short-term socioeconomic fragility, a stabilization fund-the "Fondo de Inversión para la Estabilización Económica" (FIEM)-was established in 1998. The fund was originally endowed with US$ 215 million, and it ran up to US$ 4.25 billion in 2000 (this means 3.6 percent of the country's GDP) (IMF 2008: 39) . The stabilization fund has been managed in a very nontransparent way, and has been used for the short-term expenses of the government (Davis et al. 2001: 26) . 
Conclusion
In this paper we have addressed two questions: First, on which countermeasures do re- 
28
On the other hand, sporadic prosecutions for corruption partly have been deemed to be motivated by political intentions.
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questions, we explored a medium-sized sample of petroleum-dependent countries and analyzed in more detail the petroleum-related conflict risks and countermeasures in three major oil-producing states.
The analysis finds that, in recent years, a growing number of petroleum-dependent countries have engaged in initiatives regarding indirect risk mechanisms and that at least some countries gained in political stability (Algeria, Azerbaijan, Angola, Congo, and Kazakhstan).
While not all nations with a high risk profile have shown the same eagerness to join initiatives like the EITI or PWYP or to establish a sovereign wealth fund, several conflict-prone countries have done so. In contrast, countries with a low risk profile and very high per capita rents from the petroleum sector do not participate in international transparency initiatives and limit themselves to the establishment of sovereign wealth funds (with the exception of Gabon and Norway) (see Appendix 1). This general tendency that conflict-prone countries engage in countermeasures is also reflected in our case studies.
However, both the medium-N analysis and the case studies could not prove a systematic positive correlation between the resource management measures and a reduction in resource-related risk factors. As a central result of our study, we consequently infer that no robust conclusions could be drawn about the countermeasures' contribution to the stabilization or destabilization of a country. For instance, although there have been numerous new resource management measures in Nigeria, violence in the oil-producing areas increased until the middle of 2009, and it was only recently that a rather fragile peace accord could be agreed. 29 In contrast, in Algeria the overall political stability improved between 2000 and 2009, albeit with the acknowledgement that indirect conflict mechanisms have until now not been tackled adequately. Despite an ongoing violent intrastate conflict, the oil-producing regions in Algeria were widely spared from clashes between conflicting parties-only a few attacks and kidnappings by armed groups have occurred-indicating that the Algerian government has so far succeeded in maintaining the security of the producing areas and thereby also limiting the opportunity mechanism. In Venezuela, the government first of all built upon specific distributional policies to curb the motive mechanisms. This single-sided approach has failed to contain rising political instability, but it has nevertheless helped to impede a further conflict escalation thus far.
A comparative assessment hence indicates that high social spending to curb the motive mechanism-and the amplification of the security sector to confront the opportunity mechanism-have been the most successful countermeasures, at least in the short term. However, the Venezuelan case shows that disputes and low-level conflicts over the distribution and spending of oil revenues can continue to be prominent and virulent. Moreover, the redistribution can hardly be considered sustainable because of its vulnerability to future decreases in oil price.
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Although this agreement reduced, at least temporarily, violence, its long-term impact has to be regarded with skepticism, as the recent renewed eruptions of violence indicate.
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A common feature within all the case studies is the substantial lack of implementation of the different measures. This helps to explain why in countries that were engaged in several resource-related countermeasures, no significant positive results have shown up. For example, the failure to curb the opportunity mechanisms in Nigeria can by and large be traced back to the fact that the financial revenue derived from the illegal trade in oil is a source of income not only for militants, but also for a complex network of powerful Nigerian and international actors, who clearly serve as spoilers, undermining effective implementation. The most frequent reasons discovered in our case studies for inadequate implementation are the lack of political will among government elites, weak political institutions (in all three country cases), and only limited pressure from civil society-either because of repression, as in Algeria, and in the past in Nigeria, or, as in Venezuela, because of the apparent lack of willingness among the population. Furthermore, many of the realized countermeasures have been enacted too much in isolation and, particularly, have not sufficiently considered the broader interplay of risk mechanisms in the country in question.
These preliminary results have to be put into perspective, however. It is too early for a conclusive or definitive evaluation of the consequences of these initiatives as the full impact may only become visible in the long term. We also did not test the full range of possible countermeasures in the medium-N sample. To generalize our results, future research should not only factor in the whole set of countermeasures-especially an increase of social spending or the enlargement of the security sector as our cases studies suggest-related to existent resource-related conflict risks but also allow for the inclusion of other natural resources (for example, diamonds). One promising avenue by which future efforts might unpack the natural resources-peace link could be analytical techniques, such as Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), which is especially suitable for medium-N analyses and allows for the identification of necessary and sufficient conditions for successful countermeasures.
To conclude the present study, it can be reasoned-from a conceptual perspective-that the perfect type of countermeasure does not exist; rather, the systematic identification of the different resource-specific and non-resource specific risk factors, and the interdependent risk mechanisms, at work in each respective country is a necessary precondition for the successful design of countermeasures. In other words, revenue-sharing regimes lacks effectiveness if they are not combined with major improvements in the transparency of the oil sector and with the combating of corruption at much broader levels. Otherwise, the failure of resource management initiatives has been revealed to be extremely probable, when the most virulent risk mechanisms are not addressed. These risk mechanisms might even turn into obstacles for the implementation of any further countermeasures. On the whole, future resource management measures should be integrated into more comprehensive policies that address the underlying issues and divergent causes of the different conflict risks. This also, and in particular, implies that the existence of transnationally relevant risk factors ultimately requires internationally-binding answers and regulation for the successful implementation of any countermeasures.
